Anförande vid Nuclear Security Summit 2012
Anförande i Seoul, Sydkorea
allow me to express my sincere thanks to you and to the people of the Republic of Korea for hosting this Summit, and for the great hospitality with which you've greeted us. It is always a pleasure to visit South Korea.
This meeting provides an opportunity to deepen our resolve to strengthen nuclear security, and to take stock of our work since the Summit in Washington.
In this context, I would like to announce the recent removal of separated plutonium from Sweden.
This plutonium was the product of research programs carried out in previous decades, also related to weapons.
Over the course of the last two years, we have worked jointly with the United States to safely and securely stabilize, package and transport the separated plutonium we still had to the United States.
This shipment, which was completed only this Sunday, was the first of its kind under the U.S. Global Threat Reduction Initiative. Sweden is proud to have contributed in this very practical way to our common goal to secure all vulnerable nuclear material.
As the first country to complete such a challenging and ambitious project, we stand ready to support others to eliminate excess separated plutonium.
Looking at the broader picture, I believe it's fair to say that we have made progress, but also that there is still work to be done.
The risk that terrorists would get a hold of nuclear material and use it to cause destruction and spread fear is real. And considering the possibly devastating consequences of such an act, we must do our utmost to prevent it from happening.
Measures to secure nuclear material are part of the overall efforts to safeguard the international nuclear non-proliferation regime. Our objective is a world without nuclear weapons. Securing vulnerable nuclear material is one step towards that goal.
We should also make every effort to see to it that the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty enters into force and that negotiations on a Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty can commence.
Building on the successful New START Agreement, nuclear arms control efforts need to continue, also including non-strategic, tactical nuclear weapons.
And we must implement the action plan agreed at the NPT Review Conference in 2010 and advance in all three pillars of the non-proliferation regime: nuclear disarmament, non-proliferation and peaceful uses of nuclear energy.
It is the responsibility of States to maintain effective security of nuclear materials and facilities under their control. Technologies are at hand, and we know what needs to be done.
Firstly, the use and stocks of highly enriched uranium globally should be minimized.
Sweden decided in the early 1990s to move from using highly enriched uranium to low-enriched uranium in our research reactors. Others have been taking the same step.
Secondly, and in parallel, we should reflect on how to increase transparency around all holdings of highly enriched uranium without jeopardizing security.
This could be done by developing guidelines on the management of HEU, covering all materials - be they civilian or military.
Thirdly, the importance of the timely removal and disposal of nuclear materials from facilities no longer using them has been an important focus of our efforts since Washington.
Sweden ratified the 2005 Amendment to the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material (CPPNM) in March this year. Preparations are underway to complete the ratification of the International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism. And we have extensive cooperation with the IAEA.
Sweden is supporting the IAEA Nuclear Security Fund, including financially.
In our neighbourhood, we are cooperating with Russia, Ukraine, Georgia and Moldova in specific projects to strengthen nuclear security. These are but a few examples of what Sweden is doing to contribute to our joint efforts to secure nuclear materials.